Oral History Cover Sheet

Name: Kahler R. Martinson
Date of Interview: September 13, 2005
Location of Interview: Portland, Oregon
Interviewer: John Cornely

Offices and Field Stations Worked, Positions Held: First job was in the state of Ohio coordinating statewide surveys and reporting on them; went to North Dakota as upland game biologist; worked at Management and Enforcement; worked in a trainee type position in the Assistant Director for Operations Office and eventually left as Deputy Assistant Director for the Operations Office; in 1973 went to Portland as Regional Director.

Most Important Projects: Steel Shot Program

Colleagues and Mentors: Mort Smith, Gene Knoder, Walt Crissey, Al Geis, John Rodgers, Hank Hanson,

Most Important Issues: Banning of 1080

Brief Summary of Interview: Kahler Martinson was born and raised in Ortonville, a small town in Minnesota. When Kahler was young, he would go hunting with his father in South Dakota until they were 'shut out' of waterfowl hunting but gained a love of duck hunting and ducks from this early experience. Kahler spent some time at South Dakota State and at University of Minnesota and ended up getting his graduate degree from University of Missouri. He speaks briefly about the offices/stations he worked and moves on to talk about the Migratory Bird Population Station, steel shot, area offices, and finally the evolution of waterfowl management.

John: This is John Cornely, we're in Portland in September of 2005 and I have the great pleasure of visiting with Kahler Martinson this morning, who when I started my career was the Regional Director in Portland here, my first Regional Director. And Kahler we're just going to let you tell us a little bit about yourself and your career.

Kahler: Okay John. I was born and raised in a small town in western Minnesota, Ortonville. We had kind of the tail end of some of the couteau just north of town and some larger marshes were close by where my dad used to pick me up from Sunday school and we'd go out and look at broods in the summer, and then we'd shoot them in the fall. Actually my dad, when I was very young, hunted South Dakota mostly, those were the great pheasant years in the '40's but he also hunted ducks over in, in South Dakota's couteau around small towns like Roslyn, north of Webster and places like that, and I think I shot my first duck right near Roslyn. Shortly after that South Dakota shut us out of waterfowl hunting, that wasn't, it didn't have much to do about ducks I think that was because of goose hunters tying up things over on the Missouri River. But from an early love of duck hunting and ducks, I went to school at South Dakota State, I spent a little time at University of Minnesota. And then eventually ended up in the University of Missouri for a graduate degree, not studying ducks, which I would liked to have done, but I ended up on swamp rabbits down southeast Missouri, where I had a chance to band wood ducks in the summer and mallards and blacks in the fall so I kind of kept my hand on the ducks. First job I went to the state of Ohio in a survey type job. I coordinated statewide surveys and reported on them, it was a federal aid project and fun. But I also got to go to the Flyway meetings, Mississippi Flyway Council meetings, with their waterfowl biologists Karl Bednarik and my boss Gene Knoder, who subsequently worked for the Service. We got to some neat places, Rockefeller Refuge near Grand Chenier in Louisiana, for example, and met lots of good people, all the state waterfowl biologists and others, Frank Bellrose; a lot of interesting people went to those meetings in those days. But I always wanted to be the waterfowl biologist and I could see Karl wasn't going to turn loose of that in Ohio until they pulled him out of it. And I got a chance for a job in North Dakota and I jumped at it, it wasn't a promotion exactly, in fact it was probably a demotion. But I ended up in Dickinson, North Dakota as an upland game

biologist. And there again I would liked to been the waterfowl biologist but Chuck Schroeder was in the job. I really loved the work in North Dakota but I got offered a job at the Migratory Bird Population Station and so I did it. I cried when I left North Dakota. We got into the banding data and survey data of all sorts. And at that, well Crissey and Al Geis kind of dominated the service's migratory bird work and, kind of, they did. They were almost in charge of it, they had all the data, handled the Flyway Council meetings pretty much, and so I got a really good look at how things operated. From there, because of a tragic accident, I got a chance to go downtown work for M&E [Management and Enforcement]. J.D. Smith had been killed in a helicopter accident in Minnesota. J.D. had been the section chief, I'm not sure what the title was but he had the survey and banding function of M&E. Hank Hanson was his assistant and when J.D. was killed Hank moved Mort Smith in and I. I can't recall just exactly how this all worked but Al Studholme was chief at that time. Al was subsequently moved to a position called Migratory Bird Coordinator, Chuck Lawrence was moved up to chief of M&E; all this happened over a span of a couple of years I think, maybe less. Hank was pulled up to Assistant Chief of M&E. Mort declined being the branch chief for surveys and banding and Hank approached me and brought me down. And under his and Mort's guidance, I spent probably another four years there before I was pulled up to a kind of trainee position in the Assistant Director for Operations Office. Those were great years, we, I traveled around a little bit with Mort, who pretty much supervised the fieldwork of the surveys and the banding. And Mort had a hard time giving up the flying parts, so he'd take off in the summertime and I with him for a month or so. And the other thing that we did at that point was we kind of took some of the responsibility away from Walt Crissey and Al Geis and brought it downtown. M&E sort of evolved into the leadership in handling the survey data and making the presentations to the Flyway Councils and so forth. There was a period there where things were a little bit scratchy between the two groups but I think that it was generally agreed that M&E and the Washington Office should handle the—the data end of the regulations process, they already handled the writing end of regulations. About that time, also, research brought John Rogers in to help manage the Migratory Bird Population Station. It was felt that although Walt and Al were extremely talented guys, that it need a little closer management and control. And John was brought in and he, sort

of as an Assistant Director at the Station, tried to put things back in shape at the MBPS. We gave John a couple of years there and when I was brought up into the trainee position, the Service began putting together the office of Migratory Bird Management and so we jerked out of MBPS and put him in charge of the Office of Migratory Bird Management, helped establish it and almost immediately laid the Steel Shot Program on poor John Rogers. And things were pretty hectic for a while there but I don't think that the survey and banding and the rest of the operation, the Questionnaire Survey, the Parts Survey, all that stuff, was hurt but we about killed John Rogers, I think, with the extra duty and the Steel Shot on top of all this. I did some of the front work on the Steel Shot thing but, but John pretty well carried the ball and as we all know that, that went on for ten years before it finally culminated with the, the suit by the National Wildlife Federation. And from Washington office on the, I guess I was called the Deputy Assistant Director for Operations at that time. I was offered and leaped at the opportunity to come to Portland as Regional Director, and that was in 1973; I'd been downtown for about 5 years, before that 4 years at the MBPS. And, anyway that's probably about the extent of my history with the service. Although there's a little bit after that, but that's the interesting part.

John: Okay, tell me a bit more about the MBPS.

Kahler: Okay a little about the Migratory Bird Population Station, as I remember it though my eyes I guess. I don't recall the actual date but it had to be around 1960. The Migratory Bird Population Station was established, I think with one of the primary purposes of pulling together all the migratory bird data that existed into what we called species studies. I began to work on one particular one, the mallard study, which I think lots of people are looking forward to seeing some results from. But what actually happened to us was we got pulled into developing data for the annual regulations process and it kind of consumed us I think. Walt Crissey and Al Geis and others had developed some really good survey schemes. Walt, of course, was involved in the development of the aerial surveys, but in addition to that the questionnaire survey was started, I think Earl Atwood had a lot to do with that but I think Earl Atwood hired Al Geis at Patuxent. They

developed a questionnaire survey and then later developed the Parts Collection Survey as a compliment to the Questionnaire Survey; some of the bandings schemes, the preseason banding for example, was developed by those guys. They really referred to the map, preseason mallard banding as Dew Line banding, remember the Dew Line stations the military had for spotting missiles coming into this country. But at any rate the idea there was to band ducks before the waterfowl season and just before the season to determine what Al termed as a relative recovery rate; that's a rate of return on adults verses young, which you could use to adjust age ratios from the Parts Collection. But anyway they had a whole scheme of surveys that these people had put together, Questionnaire Surveys, Parks Collection Surveys, use of the Aerial Surveys and Banding. Walt was particularly adept of describing this whole system, and it was pretty neat. Pretty expensive sometimes and not perfect, for sure, but nevertheless it was a comprehensive bunch of wildlife surveys that were very useful in developing data for the annual regulations. And you know, again, we kind of got carried away in the regulations process work and developing the data for them. It was kind of like hell week in June and July trying to pull all these data together from the previous year and come to the Regulations Committee with the data for them to consider. And in those days the Service Regulations Committee was, the voting members were the Regional Directors, I think the Chief of M&E, the Chief of Research and I'm not sure who else, but the staff of the Migratory Bird Population Station, at least some of us, were involved in this and in presenting data. As were some of the M&E folks that actually wrote the regulations once the, the committee had decided on final ones. That committee, it seems to me, met before the flyway council meetings, took recommendations to them and then came back and sat down again after they got recommendations or the reaction at least from the Flyway Councils before they were finalized. And Walt and Al were, were kind of the primary experts in presenting the status of waterfowl to that committee up until about 1968 when I moved downtown and was shifted some of that responsibility and eventually all of it from the Migratory Bird Population Station and subsequently to the Office of Migratory Bird Management. Putting the Office of Migratory Bird Management together and M&E these operational surveys from the Migratory Bird Population Station and leaving the staff of the Migratory Bird Population Station—the remaining staff, to do research type

work; I think some of the examples of the research type work that came out of there were the papers on mallards that Dave Anderson, Dick Pospahala, Chuck Henny maybe and others put together kind of like the remaining work of what I had started. They pulled together some really good stuff and of course they added much, much more to what I had done. Actually about all I had gotten done were compilations and banding data for mallards. You know another interesting thing that happened through this, which was not related organizationally but scientifically or perhaps even philosophically, was up through the '60's we had, we had operated on the strict assumption that the hunting kill directly affected the survival of, if not all ducks and geese, but mallards in particular. Al Geis had started this taking or improving on what was called the Hickey Triangle, which related to kill rate or recovery rate to mortality rate. And I was part and parcel to this whole process, in fact I did the work that went into the Green-winged Teal report, which did the Hickey Triangle for green wings, which Dave Anderson subsequently pointed out and proved that we were way off base, we were correlating two things that were generated out of the same data mortality rates on the composite dynamic method and recovery rates, which were linked and would give you a positive result anytime you did them. In the earlier days the assumption was that, that we were really affecting waterfowl survival with our hunting and our hunting regulations. After Dave Anderson's work, this changed considerably. The real question was what we were doing with hunting kill and waterfowl survival and the regulations we put in place. And it led to a quite a different philosophy and approach to setting hunting regulations. God we'd gone through those early years, starting about 1959 when the droughts first hit, three bird limits and down to 1962 we had a two-bird limit in North Dakota with one mallard; there were ducks all over that state and people were incredulous, asking what in the hell those people were doing. But at any rate, and we continued to keep the screws on, you know, through the '60's and the data seemed to hold together and then all of a sudden they didn't. Our ducks didn't add up, our kill figures verses breeding populations just didn't seem to make sense any longer and Dave Anderson kind of showed us why. But it was really a change in how we approached regulations.

Air/ground comparisons in aerial surveys, you know, early on they recognized that they weren't seeing all the ducks from the airplane. And further, they were seeing ducks at different rates, they saw a lot of the mallards that they flew over and damn few of the green-winged teal, and blue-wings were probably next. This had an effect on comparing numbers of the various species for one thing, but more technical things like the allocating the unknown part of the survey sheet. I think Walt Crissey was deeply involved in this as well and now there were other people too and I just can't tell you who they were. But at any rate they set up these air/ground comparison transects, which were on the regular aerial transects where the crew would fly and there'd be a ground crew that would count the same transects, same day, the whole kind of works like that to measure the birds, the number of birds by species and those data were used then to adjust the results of the aerial transects. Now subsequently there'd been some changes made, one of them was they used to fly the transects twice, they'd fly it one direction and come back and fly it the other direction, and I don't remember what exactly the rational was but we quit doing that doing my time. And now, I believe, and in my time just, just barely when I was still around, used a helicopter for the ground count, which was a real neat way to do it. I think now, don't they have these transects right on the operational transects?

John: Yes.

Kahler: Which is another thing that made a lot of sense. But anyway that was some very interesting work and set up by some very smart people. I happen to compile a lot of those data and even made some recommendation for change here and there. But it's amazing what some of those early guys thought about and did and were able to do, very important stuff, good.

John: Okay.

Kahler: Okay, non-toxic shot. Frank Bellrose's work did, I put a focus on losses to lead poisoning, although you know his conclusions were that you probably didn't need to do anything; we had lots of ducks in those days and besides that I think an ammunition

company had funded his study. No, that's not very kind to say that but, but anyway his conclusions made sense. But people did worry about it and I think some of the biologists in the Mississippi Flyway were some of the first to get into testing steel shot. I know they did some of the first testing at NILO Farms with lumpy steel shot that just took the choke right out of a gun, killed the ducks, and this was before Ralph Andrews was at Patuxent. But getting back to how it got started, you know I'm not real sure how it got started that Mississippi Flyway gave some impetus to thinking about it, and Nat Reed picked this up. Who put it in his pocket I'm not sure, but he's the guy that got us going with it. It ended it, for the non-toxic part, it ended up with a study at Patuxent that Ralph Andrews handled. I can remember how he used to call it Iron Shot and we called it Iron Shot and that it was really iron shot that they shot at NILO Farms, it was horrible on guns, and those were pellets that wouldn't even roll straight. But Nat took a hold of this and the Service then took off to start the ball rolling and I can remember, I know I mentioned earlier that we laid this thing on John Rodgers to manage the program, but I can remember us having to stand up at a group that was brought together in Washington and to go through kind of the history of the study of lead poisoning in waterfowl and what was going on now and, and how we saw this thing plan out. And that probably didn't do me much good, but at any rate before things went too far I had come to Portland as Regional Director, so I wasn't really hands on with steel shot but one momentous day twe had given Flyways information on numbers of ducks killed by lead poisoning or something to start the transition into nontoxic shot, in which we identified the heavy kill areas. And this was to be—I guess phased in with, in several steps. Anyway, this was, the scheme that was presented to the Flyways one year, and I can't remember what year it was. But our Flyway representative in Pacific Flyway turned up sick and so I got a phone call and they asked me to make this presentation, and that was not a lot of fun. One of the guys I worked with out there said afterwards he said, "they don't pay us enough to do that kind of work." But, of course, you know it varied so much by Flyway, Mississippi Flyway was practically behind it; Pacific Flyway against it and in all fairness, we hadn't shown the need really. So, you know, we got into things like gizzard collections and all, and it still was highly unpopular, especially out west.

John: That initial approach was going to be kind of a hot spot approach to begin with?

Kahler: Yes, it was, and to identify the so-called hot spot. The assumption was the lead was there, the ducks were dying, and that's a little flimsy when you go to a duck hunter. But the thing that really surprised me, John, was the reaction of a lot of the state waterfowl biologists. You know I was naive to the point of thinking that everybody's going think this is a good idea, it's just, you know, the devil's in the details we're going to have to work it out. But an awful lot of people were just dead set against it, and it took me a little bit by surprise. I hunted ducks and I thought well you know I'm willing to shoot some poor shot, I'll have change my behavior a little bit. But I didn't have real expensive shotguns and some things like that and I didn't hand load and that was a problem for hand loaders at first. And also Winchester came out with some really poor loads, Federal on the other hand had a leg up and they had some loads that you could really kill birds with. So there were all kinds of political problems here and not the least of which was that people don't like change, and they don't like government shoving it down your neck and the state folks don't always like what the feds want to do especially if they weren't part of the idea. There was a lot of hate out there for it and I got one of the state directors said I was Mr. Steel Shot, which came as kind of a surprise to me, and it didn't help my career, I'll put it that way. Let me talk about that one first, that was a PP&L powerline through the Klamath Basin. And one of one of our supporters there was Tom Roster, who had collected all kinds of data about duck flights going out and presented it. But I ended up in the secretary's office, who was ex-governor of Idaho. What was his name?

John: Cecil Andrus.

Kahler: Cecil Andrus, okay. Explaining our side of things and one of his aides was, was playing devils advocate and said, "Well, why don't you put it up and see what happens." And I said I don't think was that was too good an idea. And Andrus finally said, "Well," says "I've got a sister who lives in, in the Lakeview and she doesn't want to see that line go through there. So I think we'll probably go against this line." We didn't go against it,

they relocated it. But I think it was Andrus's sister that swung the deal. But the Umatilla Line was another one altogether; we caught by surprise on that one a little bit. BPA [Bonneville Power Administration] came to us and said, "We want to put this line through your refuge and we've got everybody's okay on it." Washington Parks had a role to play and they'd gone to Washington Parks and located in such way that they bought in on it, but for some reason they did not bring us into it early on. When they started talking to us about it they'd already bought or ordered the steel for the towers and, you know all that's tailor made. It made us kind of mad. And we opposed it, you know just flat out said, "You're not going to get us to agree to it, you can do it if you want to." Let me back up a little bit, I think the [U.S. Army] Corps of Engineers had the key role here because it's Corps, Corps lands. They were the ones that took people around like Washington Parks got them signed up. The Secretary of Interior at that time or shortly thereafter was Don Hodel who had been BP Administrator and he just said, "we'll give you some mitigation and that's it." It didn't surprise us, I guess, that we kind of lost it but it did seem a little bit unfair that they hadn't bought us in a little bit earlier and hadn't tried a little bit harder to keep that line off the refuge.

John: Okay.

Kahler: Okay area offices, I think you got to back way up to Nixon coming in. Had a pretty big shake up, you know we lost our good ole Director John Gottschalk but got a new one who was a different cut, quiet guy but more management orientated. And I think maybe, with a caution, that by God you need to change some things or, you know, you've had it Fish and Wildlife Service; they already took part of us for EPA and kind of got people's attention. And, so Spencer Smith engineered a reorganization, you know that's where Region 6 came from okay. But along with Region 6 and Region 1 and Region 2 bleeding badly, quite resentful as well, set up an area office scheme which, which decentralized, put power close to the people, and in theory it was a really good idea. Now I'll tell you where we went astray I think, you know hindsight, some of it wasn't hindsight we, I think we saw it at the time. And that's, we didn't have the talent to man all these area offices, and Regional Offices as well. And, of course this required a

reorganization in the Regional Office and into a Program Management system. Well we took all the good folks for the Regional Offices, that was the first step and there were damn few really competent people left after that. And I just think it didn't work for that reason, we lacked the talent for area offices; some of them worked fairly well I think, some not well at all. And maybe we went too far too fast with it, maybe we should have done it on a Region or two to start with. Again in theory it seemed good, but in practice people didn't service people, never really accepted it. With exception to area office people, of course, once they got there.

John: And so Program Management was actually intimately tied to implementation of Area Office Concept?

Kahler: Yes, it was.

Kahler: The Assistant Directors were kind of program managers in the Washington Office. We did the same thing for the regional offices and I still think it could have worked, I was an advocate for area offices and probably still am. But we just went too far too fast and I wouldn't argue that it probably should have been cut back at the time. Well you see it, it's happening now we've got California I guess, which could be a region in itself. Anyway that program management system and the reorganization were in reaction to some heavy pressure by the powers that be and I mean POWERS to keep the Service going. And, you know, the other problem with program management was that, that we tried to deal in program management terms with Congress and we should've just simply cross walked programs back into refuges, fish hatcheries, law enforcement, and so forth and not try to deal with Congress the way we did.

John: Well tell us about the EPA. I, had not heard that before you just said it. Part of it makes sense to me, but tell us what happened when EPA was formed and how that affected the Fish and Wildlife Service.

Kahler: Well I don't remember the details on this and I was not at a higher enough level to really be involved, but I knew some people that went to EPA; they were in like pesticide research and stuff, you know the work that had came out of *Silent Spring* and subsequent things went to EPA. And I think it was talked about some of the other things could have gone to the Park Service, you know like Refuges.

John: Well that was my next question is if Spencer Smith hadn't reorganized, why you're thinking that maybe we'd ended up with what Jimmy Carter talked about doing was like a big Department of Natural Resources that maybe included National Parks, Refuges, Forests, etc.

Kahler: Yeah.

Kahler: One of my boss's once said is that we almost lost it.

John: That's very interesting.

Kahler: And I have no idea really what was going on but they were tough. When Nixon first came in he had a guy by the name of Fred Malek and they naturally, replaced the Assistant Secretary and Les Glasgow was placed in that job; good ole man, nice old guy. He either did something wrong or didn't do enough right and he had one of those your desk is cleaned out, take your personal stuff home the next day type of deals; Malek; that's the way he operated then.

Okay M&E verses law enforcement. It use to be one in the same, management and enforcement, and part of the reason was that the agents did an awful lot of the fieldwork for our banding and surveys. Even while I was there Al Weinrick, agent from Sacramento, flew Montana and the Dakotas. But anyway, let me jump forward then I'll go back again. When the office of Migratory Bird Management was set up it was about the same we spun L.E. and it became the Law Enforcement Division, and the surveys and banding went under the Office of Migratory Bird Management. But back in the old Management and Enforcement days, there were flyway biologists and agents who did the

field work and each region under the M&E Chief was a law enforcement person. There was a technical assistant, who coordinated surveys and banding in the region and especially surveys; they coordinated surveys that had state cooperators and the whole thing, woodcock surveys, dove surveys, the whole works. And here are the guys I remember: Clint Lostetter was in Region 1, Kenny Bahr in Region 2, Jerry (Name), followed by Milt Reeves and then George Brakhage in Region 3; Parker Smith, long time in Region 4, and Carl Gruener in Region 5. And I dealt with these guys when I worked at the MBPS because of our relationship to banding and surveys, and then of course even more closely when I went down to M&E and was Survey Chief. The, it's kind of mixed thing, it was a real hardship on the agents who did banding and surveys, you know they were gone at months at a time, some of them. Some flew observers with the Flyway biologist, but others actually flew the surveys like Al Weinrick, again from Sacramento. Some of these poor guys would be observers in the aerial surveys and then follow it up with a banding session; this is, I'm talking about after preseason banding started. Before that there was the Duckling Banding Program, that was planned and executed to band ducklings at their hatching sites to determine where thy went. And agents pretty much manned this program, there were biologists involved as well but it was long, hard work and they were away from their family and kids, you know, those of us who have spent months away know when your kids are little they forget who you are even are. Some of the agents really enjoyed the work, I'm sure, but it was a hardship on them and all of a sudden, your district didn't have an enforcement man for a couple of months in the year as well. The philosophy kind of changed, it has a lot to do with Clark Bavin, but it also had to do with reorganizing the Service. Clark wanted the Law Enforcement group and Franklin Clark did a lot to, to professionalize our Law Enforcement Division. But the philosophy before that was they liked to see agents involved in so-called 'management work' and some of them liked it, some didn't. It was an interesting time in those days, there was the Migratory Bird Population Station, which was data analyses and compellation group, M&E was operational part of Migratory Birds, they collected the data and, of course, management enforcement also wrote the regs. at that time; that function was not kept by law enforcement, it was rather turned over to Office of Migratory Bird Management.

John: Now in the, in the Regions, Kahler, somewhere I remember someone telling me that kind of like they are today, again, that the law enforcement wasn't, even though they had these, this regional, they were, they were not regional employees, is that, is that correct that M&E Chief in a Region was more of a direct line back to Washington?

Kahler: No.

John: …the Regional Director?

Kahler: Yes, back in those days M&E was just like Refuges or Fish Hatcheries in the regions.

John: Okay.

Kahler: Yeah it was after that, when Clark first started that he kind of separated them out.

John: Okay.

Kahler: He wanted them to report directly to him, but…

John: Okay, which now has, has happened, you know…

Kahler: Oh has it?

John: …yeah a couple of years ago now. We now have an AD for Law Enforcement, just for a few years, and now all of Law Enforcement, and supposedly related to 9/11 and Homeland Security somehow, but our, we still, the structure is still, looks kind of the same except that our, what used to be our ARD in each region now is supervised directly by Washington. So far there's still a good relationship between the Regional Folks and

Law Enforcement folks that are co-located, but it's one of those things that I'm afraid over time as there's turn over that, that will kind of drift away.

Kahler: Yeah Spencer Smith and Vic Schmidt, in power at the time, the Director and Deputy Director, they said "No Clark, you're not going to centralize them." And they had a hell of a lot of independence and they did make it easier for Clark to pull together, special task forces, you know, strike forces and things. And regulating waterfowl hunting and, Walt Crissey was a great one for saying, you know "What we're doing is we're providing recreation here." And we tried our best to do it, although we were, we were pretty much shackled by our, by our assumption that waterfowl kill was affecting survival waterfowl populations. But at any rate, things started tightening up in '59 and they got pretty miserable by '62 when had two bird limits in Central and Mississippi Flyways. And during these tough times, we're looking all over the place for ducks. One of the first things that we did was provide Scaup bonuses, but decided pretty quick that a bonus was not necessary directing the affect at Scaup but at waterfowl in general. One of the biologists in South Carolina, I think summed this up the best I've ever heard it. He said, "What we tell our hunters is, count your ducks, you've got four ducks, if one of them a Scaup you can shoot another duck." So we decided maybe bonuses weren't the thing to do so we went to Scaup zones, in which you could shoot extra birds. And I can remember trying to argue out zones all over the dang place. But anyway we're trying to give hunters a little bit extra and teal season came out of this, this same kind of approach, and it sounded like a great thing. We had experimental teal seasons in '65 and I think we ran about three years till things started going to hell. (Unintelligible) started coming out in the northern production states, of course, as soon as we tried to turn it off, Louisiana and Texas got madder than hell. And poor John Gottschalk, I can remember him facing up to the Louisiana Senator and Congressman Edwards, who's in prison these days; that's a good thing. But the Senator looking down from his Armed Services Committee room, it was pretty imposing; pretty intimidating, too, but John Gottschalk would stand there and give it right back to him. But then, I think about the time guys start talking about all these mallards we had and you know they were lightly harvested, so let's give that a try. Well, we looked at that one very closely and there didn't seem to be any way you could

actually justify it with data. And I remember a Mr. Freeman from Montana finally looking at me and said, "Well why don't you just try it and see what happens." So we did. We took a drake's only approach the first year, it didn't work all that well. But I think that we evolved then just into longer seasons and better bag limits for those lightly shot plains populations. But anyway, we were trying to cut back on a lot of fall kill but trying to find ways to provide hunting recreation and the best thing that ever happened was Dave Anderson's work.

Okay when I came to Portland, the Deputy was Ted—[Perry] oh god, memory's a terrible thing. But anyway I couldn't had a better, better Deputy starting out because he had experience with National Marine Fishery Services and then our Service under John Finley and kept me out of a lot of trouble. Ed Smith was the Refuge supervisor, Marv Smith was the Fish Hatchery supervisor; I can remember someone commenting on the, he thought this was the Smith and Wildlife Service. Because we had Robert H. Smith, Robert I. Smith, J.D. Smith, including these guys. Dick Mundinger was Contracting and General Services, Larry Wells was our M&E supervisor. Who else, Homer Ford was Wildlife Services, Dale Robertson was Fisheries Services; I'm amazed I can remember some of these names.

John: What about your, your area managers…

Kahler: …then we reorganized we, you know, Larry DeBates was our, our Refuges and Wildlife Program Manager, Fred Vincent, Fisheries. I don't know if Larry Wells was still here as LE but Jack Downs was, if it wasn't Larry at that time. Ed Chamberlain, who we brought up from Atlanta, was the Federal Agent Endangered Species, keen guy. Anyway easier maybe to remember area managers, Phil (Name) was Idaho and Oregon, Joe Blum was Washington, Bill Sweeney was California and Nevada. And Hank Hanson was Hawaii and the Pacific. Phil (Name) died way before he should of and Arch Merhoff replaced him in, in Boise; good guys, all of them. Habitat was Jim Teeter, who's still around here; great golfer, good fisherman, great boat. Oh John Finley preceded me in Portland and John had been M&E chief at one time, he'd also been Director I think in Tennessee or state director. Ted Perry was, was the Deputy.

John: Okay. I knew you would get it.

Kahler: One of my first memories about ADC was the executive order banning the use of 1080 that Nat Reed engineered with a couple of staff people from the Service, this was all kept very hush, hush. I was upstairs that time and I knew something was going on but it was a big secret; that hit the western community very hard. And some wildlife managers really resented it too, and it, I think it was extremely difficult for ADC people and also the attitude at that time was, you know we were doing something bad. And we may have been doing something bad but it wasn't because we had bad people, I'll tell you that. Noah Bruhl, a predecessor and as Assistant Director in Operations, had been ADC in South Dakota. And he one time mentioned "Well most of your career is looked on now as doing something wrong." At anyway rate, we had that job and I'm convinced that our folks did a good job of it, that they worked hard. They may have promoted to some degree, but we depended on soft money from the industry to operate so if you wanted to survive you're going to do a little promoting. We obliviously didn't drive coyotes into extinction, we might of hurt some other species, inadvertently. We sure had good people here and I always felt uncomfortable because in my budget priorities they were always low. We were trying to put money in habitat preservation, things like that and I always felt like I was almost a traitor to these people because we never asked for additional money in that area. In terms of budgeting, we started a process to identify priority areas and within species, of course. And the Service kind of took this over and it got too big to handle even, but never-the-less we had areas like Columbia Basin, was one of our emphasis areas; Central Valley of California, Puget Sound. And we'd rank these and operations in those or contributing to them was where we put our budget emphasis type of thing. And I think that blip had to kind of follow that direction. Now what they did with it, whether it'd be people or equipment was up to Larry Debates and/or his staff.

I've got one little thing here, kind of the evolution in waterfowl management. In the 1950's they were developing aerial surveys and broad scale programs like the duckling banding throughout Canada and the Dakota's. And in the '60's they continued these things, except they didn't do any more duckling banding. Aerial Surveys

continued, they developed the questionnaire, 100 questionnaire surveys and Parts Collection Surveys and developed the preseason duck banding program in Canada and the northern U.S. In the '70's these things were continued in the Office of Migratory Bird Management. And probably the biggest thing that happened at that point in terms of operations was the guys really took these programs and added to them. And that's kind of like where we are now, but they did and awful amount of work in a short decade or two and we've got a pretty damn good system. You know, during all those tough years when we were going to one mallard and two ducks and three ducks and one mallard and all that kind of stuff, the Pacific Flyway was sort of left alone except we managed to tinker with this and that and the other and we did some strange things. One year we had a three mallards and/or pintail regulation in the Pacific Flyway. We predicted ahead of time it wouldn't do a darn thing to the kill, made a lot of people mad and it didn't seem to. But never the less we argued with them and we tinkered with them as we restricted other flyways and finally I talked John Chattin into laying out a bunch of data for the regulations committee. And he did, John's a smart guy, and he could do this stuff if he had the motivation. And we sold the Regs. Committee on just locking in the Pacific Flyway for about three years or so. We called them standardized regulations, well Jim Bartonek corrected us and said you know, "You're really stabilizing these regulations." We moved from there to, I think, to the High Plains and we did the same thing there and I'm not sure what's happened since. The kill in the Pacific Flyway continued to do just what it has done in the past, it goes up and down. And it cut off the fighting and gave the duck hunters a little stability, and it hasn't been adhered to since, but things haven't been as bad as they were for a while. The other thing has to do with the Mid-continent Snow Goose Population, and this was before things got really bad with them. We had a different problem, at least some of us perceived it as, and that was the short stopping of those geese in South Dakota, Nebraska and North Dakota. I was working for North Dakota when Chuck Schroeder fought his way through hunters and biologists alike to have half day shooting and goose refuges. He claimed that this would probably increase the kill of snow geese in North Dakota, and it sure as hell did. At the same time populations were building up at Sand Lake in South Dakota, DeSoto Bend, and other places up and down. And part of the problem was that we were encouraging it, the Fish

and Wildlife Service was. I spearheaded a program to cut this out, cut back planting on, on Sand Lake and Desoto, you know, let's not encourage this damn geese to stop and stay in these areas for extended periods of time. Dick Yancey of Louisiana told me at one point, I asked him about this, "Have things changed in the gulf coasts?" He says, "They sure as hell have. Those geese are getting here…" I think a month later, anyway they had survey data that showed this, and there was no question we were short stopping geese. But Bob Hodgens, who was Director in South Dakota at the time, referred to as my scorched earth policy. And even our Region 3 people, who had the Dakota's at that time, were not behind this at all and some of it was resentment against Louisiana. Okay, that's about all I wanted to cover.